The ques­ti­on which moral sta­tus the embryo has is of gre­at prac­ti­cal signi­fi­can­ce becau­se the pos­si­bi­li­ty to jus­ti­fy a govern­men­tal pro­hi­bi­ti­on of a set of important the­ra­peu­ti­cal and sci­en­ti­fic mea­su­res depends on a spe­cial and the­r­e­fo­re legal pro­tec­ta­ble sta­tus of the embryo. The iden­ti­ty argu­ment which is often used in this con­text can­not con­sti­tu­te this sta­tus due to its mere epis­te­mic cha­rac­ter under the con­di­ti­on of the determinism.