Rationality, Markets and Morals

Studies at the Intersection of Philosophy and Economics

 

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 0 (2009)

A sce­na­rio of dis­mis­sal is used to illus­tra­te a busi­ness ethi­cal reflec­tion that is gui­ded by the method of reflec­ti­ve equi­li­bri­um. Seve­ral rules of dis­mis­sal are con­side­red with respect to an alre­a­dy pro­ved prac­ti­ce and to the goals of the cor­po­ra­ti­on. The deli­be­ra­ti­on shows how the demand for cohe­rence bet­ween norms and prac­ti­ce and for the achie­ve­ment of cer­tain pur­po­ses works. The limits and chan­ces of busi­ness ethi­cal reflec­tion are indi­ca­ted on the basis of the dis­cus­sed exam­p­le. By pro­vi­ding the metho­do­lo­gi­cal frame busi­ness ethi­cists sup­port decis­i­on makers in making enligh­ten­ed decis­i­ons. They do not sup­p­ly the decis­i­on maker with the right ethi­cal theo­ry‘ which provides
Eco­no­mists, and nota­b­ly health eco­no­mists, very often add to their poli­cy recom­men­da­ti­ons the for­mu­la ‚from an eco­no­mic point of view‘. The con­tri­bu­ti­on starts by explo­ring what the mes­sa­ge of this clau­se to non-eco­no­mists might be. The vague­ness that it brings about as to the gene­ral accep­ta­bi­li­ty of claims to ‚ratio­nal‘ allo­ca­ti­on, ‚best‘ out­co­mes etc. is then, first, asses­sed with respect to the recent deba­te about IQWiG’s (the Ger­man equi­va­lent to Britain’s NICE) unor­tho­dox metho­do­lo­gy of health care eva­lua­ti­on. Weak­ne­s­ses within the theo­re­ti­cal basis of stan­dard health economist’s eva­lua­tions, well-known by theo­re­ti­cal eco­no­mists but rare­ly men­tio­ned when it comes to poli­cy advice, are then, second, poin­ted out. Final­ly, some con­se­quen­ces are drawn for what has to be done to enhan­ce the qua­li­ty and impact of poli­cy advice in the area of health resour­ce allocation.
The ques­ti­on which moral sta­tus the embryo has is of gre­at prac­ti­cal signi­fi­can­ce becau­se the pos­si­bi­li­ty to jus­ti­fy a govern­men­tal pro­hi­bi­ti­on of a set of important the­ra­peu­ti­cal and sci­en­ti­fic mea­su­res depends on a spe­cial and the­r­e­fo­re legal pro­tec­ta­ble sta­tus of the embryo. The iden­ti­ty argu­ment which is often used in this con­text can­not con­sti­tu­te this sta­tus due to its mere epis­te­mic cha­rac­ter under the con­di­ti­on of the determinism.
In seve­ral works, Hart­mut Kli­emt has deve­lo­ped an ori­gi­nal account on the neces­si­ty of ratio­ning health care and on how a ratio­ning poli­cy should be car­ri­ed out. While I agree on seve­ral important points of that view, the­re is one important aspect of his account that I do not find plau­si­ble: his cla­im that the so-cal­led ‚acu­te prin­ci­ple‘ (a prin­ci­ple that gives abso­lu­te pree­mi­nence to res­cuing iden­ti­fied lives from dying) should be one of the basic cri­te­ria to car­ry out a ratio­ning poli­cy in a libe­ral sta­te. After explai­ning Kliemt’s view on ratio­ning health care and, more spe­ci­fi­cal­ly, the foun­da­ti­ons of the acu­te prin­ci­ple, I argue that the acu­te prin­ci­ple is not sup­port­ed by our basic moral intui­ti­ons. I then app­ly the pre­vious argu­ment to the case of ratio­ning, arguing for the neces­si­ty of a com­pro­mi­se among intui­ti­ons sup­port­ing the acu­te prin­ci­ple and other moral intui­ti­ons. Final­ly, I try to show that a fea­si­ble sys­tem of public health care ser­vices is con­ceiva­ble. In doing so, I make use, with some rele­vant modi­fi­ca­ti­ons, of Kliemt’s own ideas.
Not infre­quent­ly, the so-cal­led Rule of Res­cue gets invo­ked as an alle­gedly self-evi­dent cons­traint to the CBE-goal of maxi­mi­zing health bene­fit with a given health bud­get. In this paper this cons­traint is cri­ti­cal­ly ana­ly­zed. It will be argued that some of its impli­ca­ti­ons are worth con­side­ring – but not the inher­ent­ly vague Rule as such.
Limi­t­ed resour­ces are the per­ma­nent con­di­ti­on in health care. Ratio­ning, accor­ding to H. Kli­emt, is the dis­tri­bu­ti­on of limi­t­ed resour­ces below mar­ket pri­ces to all peo­p­le in need for the­se resour­ces. The­r­e­fo­re, ratio­ning is a basic com­po­nent of every kind of human health care sys­tem. Howe­ver, the cru­cial pro­blem is how to find just and fair rules for this dis­tri­bu­ti­on under the pre­mi­se, that every pati­ent should have the same chan­ce. The allo­ca­ti­on of organs for trans­plant can ser­ve as a para­dig­ma­tic exam­p­le for stu­dy­ing ratio­ning pro­blems, as shorta­ge of organs can­not be denied nor abo­lished. H. Kli­emt com­pared the situa­ti­on with the clas­sic dec­a­th­lon. The sel­ec­tion of fac­tors and the com­bi­na­ti­on and weig­hing of the­se fac­tors for win­ning a donor organ‘ should strict­ly be rela­ted to indi­vi­du­als. Non-medi­cal cri­te­ria should gene­ral­ly be accept­ed and aut­ho­ri­zed as far as they are rele­vant to the ques­ti­on of jus­ti­ce and fair­ness. In this paper the so-cal­led soli­da­ri­ty model‘, an exam­p­le of joint rese­arch with Hart­mut Kli­emt, is intro­du­ced as an allo­ca­ti­on sys­tem with the power to enhan­ce jus­ti­ce and fairness.
The rapid pro­gress in medi­cal tech­no­lo­gy makes it unavo­ida­ble to rati­on health care. In the dis­cus­sion how to rati­on many peo­p­le cla­im that prin­ci­ples of jus­ti­ce in dis­tri­bu­ting scar­ce resour­ces should be appli­ed. In this paper we argue that medi­cal resour­ces are not scar­ce as such but scar­ci­ty is a neces­sa­ry by-pro­duct of coll­ec­ti­ve finan­cing arran­ge­ments such as social health insu­rance. So the right ques­ti­on to ask is the deter­mi­na­ti­on of the bene­fit packa­ge of such an insti­tu­ti­on. Hart­mut Kli­emt is curr­ent­ly invol­ved in a com­men­da­ble inter­di­sci­pli­na­ry rese­arch pro­ject in which prin­ci­ples of prio­ri­tiza­ti­on‘ of medi­cal care are stu­di­ed. This con­tri­bu­ti­on adds a spe­ci­fic per­spec­ti­ve to this endea­vour: we ask how the goal of dis­tri­bu­ti­ve jus­ti­ce can be inter­pre­ted in this con­text and compa­re dif­fe­rent approa­ches to imple­men­ting just‘ allo­ca­ti­on mechanisms.
We often lack clear pro­ce­du­res for asses­sing state­ments and argu­ments advan­ced in ever­y­day con­ver­sa­ti­ons, poli­ti­cal cam­paigns, adver­ti­se­ments, and the other mul­ti­fa­rious uses to which ordi­na­ry lan­guage can be put. Cri­ti­cal thin­king is a method for eva­lua­ting argu­ments couch­ed in ordi­na­ry, non-for­mal lan­guage. Legal edu­ca­ti­on should fos­ter this argu­men­ta­ti­ve skill as an abili­ty to assess the open-end varie­ty of argu­ments that may ari­se in legal dis­pu­tes. I will argue that the abili­ty of cri­ti­cal thin­king helps lawy­ers to thri­ve even in legal cul­tures that are hosti­le to cri­ti­cal thin­king. The­re is, the­r­e­fo­re, a hap­py harm­o­ny bet­ween pro­fes­sio­nal and moral reasons to teach cri­ti­cal thin­king at law schools: it pro­mo­tes epis­te­mic as well as instru­men­tal rationality.
Phi­lo­so­phers and legal theo­rists still dis­agree about the cor­rect ana­ly­sis of rights‘, both moral and legal. The Will Theo­ry‘ and the Inte­rest Theory‘–the two main views–can each account for various fea­tures of rights, but neither of them is total­ly satis­fac­to­ry. The con­tro­ver­sy has now been run­ning for deca­des and seems irre­sol­va­ble. I will con­t­end in this paper that the dis­cus­sion of value plu­ra­lism‘ in the Ber­li­ni­an tra­di­ti­on can illu­mi­na­te the deba­te over the con­cept of rights.
This paper uses the con­cept of power to ana­ly­ze Machiavelli’s The Prin­ce and the Dis­cour­ses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livi­us. This helps to distil the ele­ments that form the Machia­vel­li pro­gram that has its short-term aim in the for­ma­ti­on of a natio­nal sta­te of Ita­ly. A uni­fi­ca­ti­on of Ita­ly under the umbrel­la of a prin­ce­ly fami­ly (such as iden­ti­fied with Cesa­re Bor­gia) was meant to be the first stage in an evo­lu­tio­na­ry pro­cess which, in the end, could lead to a more or less sta­ble repu­bli­can sys­tem. For the lat­ter, the Roman Repu­blic as descri­bed in the Dis­cour­ses is Machiavelli’s model. The use of power, but also the mini­miza­ti­on of cruel­ties, and the par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on of the peo­p­le, eit­her in the form of militia to suc­cessful­ly fight for­eign armies or to sup­port the prin­ce­ly govern­ment, are major ingre­di­ents to this process.

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RMM is an interdisciplinary publication focusing on issues of rationality, market mechanisms, and the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. It provides a forum for dialogue between philosophy, economics, and related disciplines, encouraging critical reflection on the foundations and implications of economic processes.

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Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 0 (2009)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 1 (2010)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 2 (2011)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 3 (2012)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 4 (2013)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 5 (2014)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 6 (2015)