Rationality, Markets and Morals

Studies at the Intersection of Philosophy and Economics

 

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 0 (2009)

The assign­ment of rights to as low poli­ti­cal levels as pos­si­ble recom­mends its­elf becau­se pre­fe­ren­ces of citi­zens are bet­ter known at the com­mu­nal, pro­vin­cial or sta­te level, becau­se their influence is grea­ter, poli­ti­cal powers are more dis­tri­bu­ted and sin­ce decen­tra­liza­ti­on fur­thers effi­ci­en­cy and inno­va­ti­on in a sys­tem. Thus sub­si­dia­ri­ty requi­res that only the neces­sa­ry frame­work and tho­se decis­i­ons rela­ted to cases with strong exter­na­li­ties or to public goods cove­ring the who­le socie­ty are taken at the hig­hest level. Loo­king from this per­spec­ti­ve at the Lis­bon Trea­ty pro­po­sed for the Euro­pean Com­mu­ni­ty seve­ral important short­co­mings are found which are main­ly rela­ted to the fields of over­lap­ping com­pe­ten­ci­es of the Uni­on and the mem­ber sta­tes. It is shown that the prin­ci­ple of sub­si­dia­ri­ty, which has to be safe­guard­ed by intro­du­cing ade­qua­te insti­tu­ti­ons, would be much bet­ter ser­ved by the pro­po­sals of the Euro­pean Con­sti­tu­tio­nal Group.
The paper con­sists of two parts. The first part deals with the nor­ma­ti­ve legi­ti­ma­cy of poli­ti­cal com­mu­ni­ties, such as sta­tes and con­fe­de­ra­ti­ons, in gene­ral, i.e. their accep­ta­bi­li­ty in light of reasonable stan­dards of effi­ci­en­cy, com­mon good, and jus­ti­ce from the view­points of their mem­bers on the one hand (inter­nal legi­ti­ma­cy) and their social sur­roun­dings on the other (exter­nal legi­ti­ma­cy). The requi­re­ments of both aspects of legi­ti­ma­cy are spe­ci­fied in a two­fold way: as nor­ma­ti­ve ide­als and as mini­mum stan­dards. As to the lat­ter, a poli­ti­cal community’s legi­ti­ma­cy mini­mal­ly requi­res that it effec­tively gua­ran­tees the fun­da­men­tal human rights of its mem­bers and com­pli­es with cer­tain basic pre­cepts of a peaceful and gene­ral­ly bene­fi­ci­al inter­na­tio­nal order. On this basis, the second part scru­ti­ni­zes the legi­ti­ma­cy of the Euro­pean Uni­on with regard to its inter­nal and exter­nal aspects. This attempt leads to a mixed result. Even though the EU can cer­tain­ly be regard­ed, by and lar­ge, as a desi­ra­ble pro­ject, it also suf­fers from a num­ber of con­sidera­ble defects that wea­k­en its legitimacy.
The paper addres­ses the issue of how the noti­on of com­mon or public weal can be spe­ci­fied for a demo­cra­tic poli­ty as a „coope­ra­ti­ve ven­ture for mutu­al advan­ta­ge“ (Rawls). It is argued that com­mon weal in demo­cra­tic poli­tics is to be unders­tood as its capa­ci­ty to pro­du­ce mutu­al advan­ta­ges for the citi­zen­ry and that the mea­su­ring rod for this capa­ci­ty is citi­zen sove­reig­n­ty, i.e. the respon­si­ve­ness of demo­cra­tic poli­tics to citi­zens‘ com­mon inte­rests. Sub­si­dia­ri­ty is ana­ly­zed as an orga­niza­tio­nal prin­ci­ple in poli­tics that can ser­ve as an instru­ment for advan­cing citi­zen sovereignty.
In the cour­se of the histo­ry of demo­cra­tic voting rights a remar­kab­le deve­lo­p­ment has taken place: coll­ec­ti­ve pri­vi­le­ges to vote were com­ple­te­ly repla­ced by a per­so­na­li­sa­ti­on of voting rights. Today, it is per­cei­ved as self-evi­dent that every adult citi­zen has the right to vote. But neither the clas­si­cal forms of demo­cra­cy ack­now­led­ged such a right nor is it pro­mo­ted by the con­di­ti­ons of modern mass socie­ty. The­r­e­fo­re, its emer­gence and dis­se­mi­na­ti­on is a his­to­ric ‚mira­cle‘ and an achie­ve­ment that is based on the fun­da­men­tal poli­ti­cal con­cept of a ‚per­son‘. This con­cept has to be pro­tec­ted at all tim – and today afresh – against the ever-pre­sent dan­gers of ero­si­on and neglect.
Cri­ti­cism of con­tract theo­ry has always play­ed an important role in Hart­mut Kliemt’s wri­tin­gs on poli­ti­cal phi­lo­so­phy. Not­wi­th­stan­ding his objec­tions to a con­sent-based jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of the sta­te he has never sub­scri­bed to an anar­chist posi­ti­on. In Hart­mut Kliemt’s view, a mini­mal sta­te which pro­tects the basic liber­ties of its citi­zens has to be con­side­red legi­ti­ma­te. The artic­le beg­ins with a brief restate­ment of the most influ­en­ti­al objec­tions that have been rai­sed against the various forms of con­tract theo­ry. The­re­af­ter inte­rest­ba­sed accounts of poli­ti­cal legi­ti­ma­cy are cri­ti­cal­ly exami­ned; it is argued that indi­vi­du­al inte­rests fail to pro­vi­de a jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on for any kind of poli­ti­cal aut­ho­ri­ty. Final­ly, phi­lo­so­phi­cal anar­chism is sug­gested as a pos­si­ble alter­na­ti­ve to con­tract theo­ry and inte­rest theo­ry. Alt­hough phi­lo­so­phi­cal anar­chism holds that no sta­te has a moral right to rule, it can be recon­ci­led with the view that it is in the individual’s inte­rest to crea­te and main­tain a mini­mal state.
Jus­ti­ce is intrin­si­cal­ly dis­tri­bu­ti­ve; it dis­tri­bu­tes by its rules. Dis­tri­bu­ti­ve‘ or social‘ jus­ti­ce redis­tri­bu­tes by over­ru­ling them. It has theo­ries that do not start from here‘. It has no rules; it makes claims ins­tead. Both its names are frau­du­lent ali­a­ses, social‘ per­haps less bla­tant­ly so. Satis­fac­tion of a cla­im in ‚social‘ jus­ti­ce depends on poli­tics and tends to favour the poorer half of socie­ty. This com­mands gene­ral sym­pa­thy, but sym­pa­thy does not make it any less unjust. 
In order to ana­ly­ze what can plau­si­bly be said about the rela­ti­onship bet­ween digni­ty, human rights, and demo­cra­cy, I will pro­po­se a basic assump­ti­on about human digni­ty (I) and then for­mu­la­te five the­ses con­cer­ning the jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of demo­cra­cy (II) which will allow me to con­clude (III) that only when human rights are con­sti­tu­tio­nal­ly estab­lished and effec­tively imple­men­ted demo­cra­cy can be theo­re­ti­cal­ly and prac­ti­cal­ly jus­ti­fied as a poli­ti­cal means to gua­ran­tee human dignity.
Human decis­i­on making is a pro­cess gui­ded by dif­fe­rent and part­ly com­pe­ting moti­va­tions that can each domi­na­te beha­vi­or and lead to dif­fe­rent effects depen­ding on strength and cir­cum­s­tances. ‚Over-sty­li­zing‘ negle­cts such com­pe­ting con­cerns and con­text-depen­dence, alt­hough it faci­li­ta­tes the emer­gence of ela­bo­ra­te gene­ral theo­ries. We illus­tra­te by examp­les from social dilem­ma expe­ri­ments and ine­qua­li­ty aver­si­on theo­ries that swee­ping empi­ri­cal claims should be avoided.
We con­sider a theo­re­ti­cal model of co-evo­lu­ti­on of net­works and stra­te­gies who­se com­pon­ents are exclu­si­ve­ly sup­port­ed by expe­ri­men­tal obser­va­tions. We can show that a par­ti­cu­lar kind of sophisti­ca­ted beha­vi­or (anti­ci­pa­to­ry bet­ter rep­ly) will result in sta­ble popu­la­ti­on sta­tes which are most fre­quent­ly visi­ted in co-evo­lu­ti­on experiments.
We sur­vey rese­arch on incur­ring com­mit­ments by vol­un­t­a­ry hos­ta­ge pos­ting as a mecha­nism of coope­ra­ti­on. The Trust Game is employ­ed as a para­dig­ma­tic exam­p­le of coope­ra­ti­on pro­blems. We sketch a very simp­le game-theo­re­tic model that shows how vol­un­t­a­ry hos­ta­ge pos­ting can bind the trus­tee and thus indu­ce trustful­ness of the trus­tor as well as trust­wort­hi­ness of the trus­tee. We then indi­ca­te how the model can be impro­ved by inclu­ding uncer­tain­ty and incom­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on, tran­sac­tion cos­ts of hos­ta­ge pos­ting and com­pen­sa­ting effects as well as signal­ing effects of hos­ta­ges. Fur­ther exten­si­ons of the theo­re­ti­cal ana­ly­sis are out­lined as well as test­a­ble hypo­the­ses and refe­ren­ces to empi­ri­cal rese­arch. Pro­blems for future rese­arch are suggested.

Journal Information

RMM is an interdisciplinary publication focusing on issues of rationality, market mechanisms, and the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. It provides a forum for dialogue between philosophy, economics, and related disciplines, encouraging critical reflection on the foundations and implications of economic processes.

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Volumes

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 0 (2009)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 1 (2010)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 2 (2011)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 3 (2012)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 4 (2013)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 5 (2014)

Rationality, Markets, and Morals: RMM Band 6 (2015)