The aim of this paper is to con­tri­bu­te to ans­we­ring the con­cep­tu­al ques­ti­on whe­ther the­re can be weak-wil­led non-human ani­mals. After some preli­mi­na­ry cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­ons con­cer­ning the phe­no­me­non of weak­ne­ss of will three dif­fe­rent accounts are exami­ned for the con­di­ti­ons a being has to ful­fill in order to be in a posi­ti­on to dis­play weak­ne­ss of will. It is argued that the­se con­di­ti­ons are very strong and that the­re are good reasons to assu­me that, e.g., only lan­guage users can be weak-wil­led. This is taken as an inde­pen­dent argu­ment for Davidson’s the­sis that non-human ani­mals which are not lan­guage users can­not act intentionally.